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Ernesto A. Bustamante
University of Idaho

Enhancing Decision Making
by Implementing Likelihood
Alarm Technology in
Integrated Displays

Complex environments with automated systems, such as aircraft cockpits and nuclear
control rooms, require critical decisions to be made about human intervention. Human
monitors operating in these roles must interact with copious amounts of information.
Decision support tools within integrated displays, especially alarms, aid people in
monitoring these systems by capturing their attention to focus on possibly dangerous
conditions. Once signaled, monitors choose whether they wish to acknowledge the alarm
and search for more process status, or ignore it. This study investigates the impact of
likelihood alarm technology versus traditional binary alarms on decision making accuracy
and response bias in this acknowledgement phase using a two-stage Signal Detection
Model. Participants performed two low-fidelity, twenty-min flight missions consisting of
dual primary tasks, compensatory tracking and fuel management, and a secondary
engine-monitoring task. Probability of engine malfunctions (10%, 90%) and type of alarm
system (Binary vs. Likelihood) were manipulated for each participant. It was
hypothesized that the probability of engine malfunctions (P), and likelihood alarm
technology (LAT) would interact with decision making accuracy. Additionally, a main
effect of P on decision making bias was expected. Results showed that LAT significantly
increased accuracy, especially under low P conditions, but had no effect on response
bias. The results of this study support prior literature's findings on the superiority of LAT
over binary alarms in complex tasks characterized by high workload, translating to better
monitoring performance for many practical applications.

Technology has granted the ability to allocate
functions, traditionally carried out by humans, to
automated systems. Nearly every facet of our
infrastructure is impacted by automation, as its
supplements to human performance are well
established (Sheridan, 2002; Sheridan &
Parasuraman, 2006). For examples of
implementation, consider nuclear power, ground
transportation, air traffic control, aviation, and
collision-warning systems (Parasuraman, Hancock,
& Olofinboba, 1997), as well as medical diagnosis
(Li, Lin, & Chang, 2004), luggage screening (Drury,

Ghylin, & Holness, 2006), and cockpit display
monitoring (Bailey & Scerbo, 2005).
Automation and Human Performance
Automation harnesses computational power to
perform tasks otherwise apportioned to human
operators, with the intent of a higher performing
human-machine system. This is especially true in
complex environments characterized by high levels
of workload. Humans and computers have unique
strengths for specific tasks that, once identified, can
be properly merged into a smoothly functioning
team. For instance, the employment of alarms in
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complex task scenarios has augmented human
performance as well as safety (Sorkin, Kantowitz, &
Kantowitz, 1988). Nevertheless, as the field of
human factors demonstrates, there is always room
for improvement, and concerns over traditional
binary alarm systems (BAS) have rallied support for
new technology. Likelihood alarm technology (LAT)
provides differing alarm signals based on the
predicted validity ofthere being an actual problem.
One main concern with BAS is unreliability. LAT
offers superior decision support because human
monitors tend to match their response rates to the
indicated probability of a real problem existing. This
study provides evidence for the superiority of LAT,
in terms of decision making, over traditional BAS.
A definite benefit of automated systems is
executing specific tasks in a more accurate and
reliable manner than sole human operators.
However, it is important to understand that
automation must be applied properly, considering
both its own and the human operator's limitations.
Empirical research shows that humans tend to trust
overly-reliable alarm systems too much, becoming
complacent to the extent that performance degrades
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997; Wickens and Dixon,
2007). Wickens and Dixon also remind us that when
diagnostic automation is too imperfect and unreliable
(their analysis concludes .70), it can literally be
useless, or even result in worse than baseline human
performance. Judicious function allocation among
humans and automation is required to profit from the
merits of automated systems. Sorkin and Woods
(1985) also advocate the importance of designing
automated monitoring systems around total humanmachine performance instead of just automated
subsystem performance.
System Operators to System Monitors
Along with procuring traditional operator
functions, automation has qualitatively transformed
the role of people in complex tasks from operators
to monitors (Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
Technological development has changed the human
role to chiefly that of supervisory control (Sheridan
& Hennessy, 1984; Woods, 1982), whose main
function is to monitor a number of automated
displays. Automated factories using extensive
robotics, the flight decks of commercial aircrafts,

and power plant control rooms are examples
described by Sorkin and Woods (1985) of
decision-making environments in which human
operators act an alerted-monitor role. Xiao and
Seagull (1999) assert that monitoring is not a passive
task but rather the act of maintaining continual
situational awareness. In these settings, an
automated monitor subsystem assists human
operators by executing preprogrammed decisions
about system conditions. These decisions are made
based on inputs, such as incoming data and process
state, which are weighed against expectations of
what constitutes normal and abnormal operating
conditions (Woods, 1995). This shift of humans'
roles into a supervisory monitoring state necessitates
dynamic fault management.
Dynamic Fault Management
The above examples of environments where
humans interact with and rely on automation are
permeated with what is called dynamic fault
management. As the name denotes, dynamic fault
management represents a situation where a complex
system's conditions are being monitored to identify
and address problems that arise. In complex
environments, such as the control room of a nuclear
power plant, there are safety-critical tasks that
demand more resources than a lone human operator
can provide. It is important to monitor the conditions
of a nuclear reactor for more than just safety
reasons, as millions of people are relying on it for
power, and the monetary costs of compromising
system integrity are extreme. Humans are infamous
for conducting poor dynamic fault management. This
occurs for a variety of reasons, many being related
to the problem of sustaining vigilance while
monitoring some type of display. Decision support
tools (DSTs) were created to combat this
inadequacy. In addition, legal concerns and
technologies' rapid development compel system
designers to incorporate alarm systems into dynamic
fault management situations. Alarm systems are a
type of DST that are discussed below.
Decision Support Tools
Previously active system users, human operators'
now-common role of vigilant attention tasks in
complex environments is made even more difficult
by high levels of workload. Consequently, DSTs
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accuracy can. Accuracy is now a minor issue owing
were created to aid human monitors for these types
of environments. Alarm systems are a major form of to sophisticated fault diagnosis algorithms and sensor
technologies that are so highly developed as to
DST. According to Xiao and Seagull (1999), they
operate nearly perfectly. Threshold is the
are affixed to displays and devices on humanpredetermined limit ofthese sensors and algorithms
machine interfaces (out of direct consideration to
that, when exceeded by system-condition cues,
human performance limitations) to report process
trigger an alarm's signal. To ensure that most
status. Woods (1995) argues the alarm role in
dangerous system conditions are detected, alarm
dynamic fault management settings as that of
functioning to create an attentional capture effect on designers are forced to set thresholds at low levels in
a so called "fail-safe approach." This means that
alerted human monitors. The usefulness of alarm
given an actual problem, there is a very high
systems lies in their plausible ability to enhance
probability that the alarm will transmit it to the human
human performance in numerous complex tasks
monitor. However, given an alarm, the probability of
(Bustamante & Bliss, 2004; Gupta, Bisantz, &
an actual problem is quite low, because a whole
Singh, 2002; Sorkin, Kantowitz, & Kantowitz,
range of system conditions may exist falling above
1988). Especially in complex systems, human
the
threshold but not necessarily indicating a real
operators may become overwhelmed with status
problem. Probability of problematic conditions,
information that taxes memory, attention, and
decision-making capacities (Fallon, Bustamante, Ely, PPV's third determining factor, is self explanatory.
& Bliss, 2005). In this study, two types of DST's we Also known as the 'base rate' of dangerous
conditions, this factor represents the likelihood of
compared, BAS and LAS, are discussed after the
succeeding section. We used the EICAS engine
dangerous conditions actually occurring. For
monitoring alarm system, which is currently being
instance, take an overly sensitive car alarm that
activates nearly every day. Most of its alerts are
used in commercial aviation, and manipulated it as
false alarms because the probability, or base rate, of
either a binary or likelihood system with 10% or
dangerous conditions may only be 5%. That is, only
90% probabilities of engine malfunctions.
Positive Predictive Value of Alarm Systems
five percent of the time will there actually be an
attempted break in—which is what the car owner
Alarm signal 'reliability' is a common term for
purchased the alarm for. It is not difficult to identify
positive predictive value (PPV). PPV is defined as
the conundrum of setting thresholds too
the conditional probability that given an alarm, a
problem actually exists (Bustamante & Bliss, 2005). conservatively in systems with low base rates; false
alarms (FAs) are frequent. A high number of FAs
A phenomenon known as 'probability matching'
impart numerous undesirable effects on the human
occurs when people approximately match their
response rate to a given alarms' PPV (Bliss, Gilson, monitor. Stressed factory workers may easily learn
to ignore various systems known to generate many
& Deaton, 1995). For instance, a human monitor
FAs, figuring they are probably not indicating a true
that knows a particular alarm system's PPV is 80%
will tend to acknowledge about four out of five
problem among more pressing issues. PPV is often
alarm signals. Similarly, if he or she knows an alarm
low for alarm systems due to low base rates in most
system's PPV to be 20%, then roughly one in five
settings, and preprogrammed sensitive thresholds.
signals will get acknowledged. Evidence for altered
The result of alarms' undesirable ratio of FAs to true
acknowledgement frequencies, motivated by PPV,
alarms (TAs) is explained in more detail later.
has been documented by researchers (Bliss & Dunn, Binary Alarm Technology
2000; Bliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995; Getty, Swets,
Sorkin & Woods (1985) parsimoniously explain
Picket, & Gonthier, (1995). PPV is dependent on
BAT: automated monitors display messages to the
three factors: accuracy, threshold, and the
system operator when a preset threshold value is
probability of problematic conditions. Problematic
surpassed by measured conditions. Engineers have
condition probabilities (or base rates) cannot be
traditionally utilized this alerting approach, which has
manipulated by alarm designers, but thresholds and
now come to be known as the binary alarm
38

within complex tasks, such as an aircraft cockpit,
tradition. BAT produces only one type of alarm
signal, regardless ofthe underlying conditions. When may cause more mayhem then no automation at all.
Two issues of concern here are reliance, explained
that preset threshold (determined by system
designers) is violated, an alarm is activated. This is a earlier in concurrence with PPV, and compliance.
problem when considering how most systems emit a Compliance is the degree to which monitors follow
high amount of false alarms. Out-of-the-loop human alarm advisories (which are typically unreliable given
monitors encounter much trouble trying to distinguish low PPV). Given low base rates and consequent
PPV found in most task settings, display integration
true from false alarms. In fact, Sorkin and Woods
has become popular. Display integration is the
(1985) go on to cite that BAT monitors often have
inclusion of many displays into one or few, based on
problems identifying, prioritizing, and reacting to
the proximity compatibility principle. This principle,
novel situations with this type of alarm (Banks &
as explained by Wickens & Carswell (1995),
Boone, 1981; Cooper, 1977; Kragt & Bonten,
declares that displays relevant to a similar mental
1983). Decision making under circumstances of
operation or task should be located close together.
complexity and stress becomes further confounded
Although display integration has many merits,
when considering monitors' out of the loop role.
operator compliance becomes an issue because it is
Likelihood Alarm Technology
difficult for the human monitor to know what is
As opposed to BAT, LAT emits various signals
actually happening within the system. This is known
indicating PPVs that depend on the extent of
sensitivity-threshold violation. Sorkin, Kantowitz, & as out-of-the-loop performance; where the human
monitor/operator is one step removed from the
Kantowitz (1988) explain LAT as an automated
system with an alarm conveying no information
monitoring system that encodes dangerous event
beyond one alarm signal. An overly compliant, or
likelihood into an alerting signal for the human
completely untrusting, monitor cannot be expected
operator. In their study of LAT displays, results
showed improved primary and secondary task
to make premium decisions under complex, high
performance as well as decision making impacts
workload situations where the only information
without compromising attentional load. In a previous available is that an alarm threshold has been
study, Sorkin & Woods (1985) contend that if an
violated. Performance may suffer when users reduce
automated subsystem could provide multiple criteria compliance and begin to distrust alarm technology
indicating the conservatism ofthreshold violation,
(Parasuraman & Riley, 1997).
human monitors could re-evaluate resource
Alarms and the "Cry-Wolf Effect"
allocation strategies. Support exists for the
To improve alarm effectiveness, consider the
contention that people change their responsiveness
following. Since highly developed fault diagnosis
depending on differing alarm system outputs (Meyer algorithms and sensor technologies solve the
& Ballas, 1997; Robinson & Sorkin, 1985), which
accuracy factor of alarms, and base rates of
is the basis for LAT development. This is useful in
problematic conditions are out of human's control,
situations characterized by high workload, where
let's analyze threshold sensitivity. Traditional binary
several tasks must be monitored and limited
alarm displays emit one signal, regardless of how
attention must be allocated based on critical
extreme thresholds have been violated, and
decisions. Summarily, LAT is valuable because it
minimally indicative of actual urgency. A large
empowers human monitors with PPV knowledge
proportion ofBATs are unreliable because they emit
that they can use to respond more often to true
so many false alarms (Getty, Swets, Pickett, &
alarms compared to false alarms (Bustamante &
Gonthier, 1995). As Bustamante, Fallon, & Bliss
Bliss, 2005; Bustamante, Fallon, & Bliss, 2005).
(2005) point out, a common user response to this
Display Integration and Out-of-the-Loop
unreliability is distrust in the alarm- known as the
Performance
"cry-wolf effect" (Bremitz, 1983). Obviously,
Again, it is imperative to apportion automation's
human monitors working in vital roles would benefit
roles accordingly. Improper function delegation
from trustworthy alarm technology. Monitors falling
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victim to the cry wolf effect may ignore true alarms,
risking system integrity and even people's lives.
Bustamante, Fallon, & Bliss (2005) go on to
propose that one way to empower users in better
distinguishing FAs from TAs is an alerting display
that presents the likely validity of each alarm signal.
LAT accomplishes this vision through urgency
mapping (Edworthy & Adams, 1996), providing
monitors with an indication of how hamdous system
conditions may be based upon the degree of
sensitivity-threshold violation. Decision making
accuracy and response bias were calculated based
on the a b Signal Detection Theory developed by
Bustamante,A.E. (under review), which is specially
adapted to these measures.
Goal of this research
This study sought to analyze the effects of LAT
on human monitors' decision making during use of
aviation displays in a complex, multi-task, flight
simulation. Participants' decisions were analyzed in
terms of response bias and accuracy using a two
stage decision making model introduced by
Bustamante, Bliss, and Newlin (2008). Dangerous
condition probabilities, alarm reliability, and LAT
versus BAT were manipulated in an effort to
examine how much LAT impacts decision making.
Hypothesis
It was hypothesized that the probability of engine
malfunction (P), and LAT would interact with
decision making accuracy. Additionally, a main effect
of P on decision making bias was expected.
Manipulating P by default changes the EICAS 's
PPV, so participant response rates were expected to
parallel reliability levels, a tendency first noted by
Dorfman (1969), and later by Bliss, Gilson, &
Deaton (1995). A main effect of P on bias, which is
the tendency of participants to affirmatively respond,
was expected based on prior research by
Bustamante & Bliss (2005) that found workload to
have main effects on overall and true alarm response
rates.

Method
Experimental Design
A 2 x 2 between-groups design was used for this
study. The reliability of the alarm system was

manipulated at two extremes ofthe continuum (i.e.,
10% and 90%) following a similar methodology as
Bustamante, Bliss, and Anderson (2007). The use of
LAT was manipulated following Bustamante
(2005)'s methodology comparing two types of
alarm systems (i.e., a BAS and a LAS).
Participants
A power analysis revealed that approximately 40
participants would be necessary to obtain
statistically significant effects at a .05 alpha level,
assuming a power of .80 and a medium effect size
for each factor (Cohen, 1988). Therefore, 40 (20
females, 20 males) undergraduate and graduate
students participated in this study. Participants
ranged from 18 to 30 years of age (M= 21.90, SD
= 3.28). They all had normal or corrected-to-normal
vision and hearing. Participants were compensated
with one and half research credits as a form of
incentive to participate in this study. In addition to
this, a $25.00 gift card was awarded to the
participant with the best performance to motivate
participants to perform at their maximum level.
Materials and Apparatus
This study took place in a laboratory with an
average ambient noise level of 45 dB(A). As part of
this experiment, participants completed a simulated
roundtrip flight. Each simulated flight leg lasted 20
min. To complete each simulated flight leg,
participants had to perform two main flight tasks in
addition to a secondary engine-monitoring task.
Primary Flight Tasks. The primary flight tasks
were simulated using the Multi-Attribute Task
Battery (MATB) designed by Comstock and
Arnegard (1992) and consisted of a dual-axis
compensatory-tracking task and a resourcemanagement task (see Figure 4).
Compensatory-Tracking Task. The main
purpose of this task was to simulate the primary
function that pilots need to perform to fly an
airplane, which is to maintain level flight. Participants
were tasked with keeping a circle that randomly
fluctuated along the vertical and horizontal axes as
close to the centre as they could.
Resource-Management Task. The main purpose
ofthis task was to simulate another important
function that pilots need to perform as they fly an
airplane, which is to make sure that they have an
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optimal level of fuel in their tanks. Participants were
required to keep an optimal level of fuel on the two
main tanks, while preventing any of the secondary
tanks from being depleted.
Secondary Engine-Monitoring Task. The main
purpose of this task was to simulate a crucial
secondary function that pilots need to perform to
maintain flight safety, which is to ensure that they
have at least one fully functioning engine at all times.
Participants performed this task with the aid of a
simulated Engine Indicating and CrewAlerting
System (EICAS), which varied in its degree of
reliability (i.e., 10% or 90%), which was
manipulated through changes in the probability of
engine malfunctions, and the use of LAT (i.e., BAS
or LAS), which was implemented following the
same methodology as the one used by Bustamante
(2005). Participants were tasked with either
acknowledging or ignoring alarms emitted by the
EICAS. Each alarm was composed by a visual
stimulus (see Figure 5) as well as an auditory
stimulus, which was presented to participants at 55
dB(A) through a set of sound-attenuated
headphones. In case they decided to acknowledge a
particular alarm, they gained access to additional
system-status information (see Figure 6) to help
them make a corrective action when necessary.
Procedure
Participants came to the laboratory individually.
First, the experimenter greeted them and provided
them with the informed consent form. Second, the
experimenter asked participants to silence or turn off
their cellular phones if they had one. Third, the
experimenter assigned each participant an
identification number. Fourth, the experimenter
asked participants if they had any questions
regarding the nature ofthe study. Ifparticipants
decided to participate, the experimenter asked them
to sign and date the informed consent form. Fifth,
the experimenter asked participants to complete the
background and contact information form. Sixth, the
experimenter showed participants the instructions for
completing the study and asked them to read them
carefully. Seventh, the experimenter instructed
participants to place the set of stereo headphones on
their heads and adjust them to fit comfortably.
Eighth, the experimenter showed participants the
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familiarization screen and instructed them about
how to use the graphical user interface of the
program. Ninth, the experimenter showed
participants how to navigate through the program
to the first session and explained all the information
displayed on the screen. Last, the experimenter
answered any final questions participants had
regarding the completion of the study.

Results
Alarm Response Accuracy
Table 1 shows the observed means and
standard deviations of participants' alarm response
accuracy across all four conditions.
A 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA was
conducted to examine the effects of the probability
of engine malfunctions (.10, .90) and the type of
alarm system (BAS, LAS) on participants' alarm
response accuracy. Results showed a statistically
significant interaction effect, F(1, 36) = 34.17,p <
.01, partial 12 = .49, observed power = .1.00.
Results also showed statistically significant main
effects for both factors (see Table 2).
As shown in Figure 1, the use of the LAS
significantly increased participants' alarm response
accuracy only when the probability of engine
malfunctions was .10.
Alarm Response Bias
Table 3 shows the observed means and
standard deviations of participants' alarm response
bias across all four conditions.
A 2 x 2 between-groups ANOVA was
conducted to examine the effects of the probability
of engine malfunctions (.10, .90) and the type of
alarm system (BAS, LAS) on participants' alarm
response bias. Results showed a statistically
significant interaction effect, F(1, 36) = .06,p <
.01, partial 12 = .00, observed power = .1.00.
There were no other statistically significant effects
(see Table 4).
As shown in Figure 2, response bias did not
vary with the type of alarm system, but did depend
on the probability of engine malfunction.

The results of this experiment, showing that
decision making accuracy can be enhanced with
Results demonstrate that LAT improved decision LAT, apply to many practical domains. For instance,
implementing LAT into the cockpits of commercial
making given a low, realistic base rate of dangerous
and
military aircraft may reduce risk because of its
conditions. Many applied settings are characterized
by low base rates, which just happen to be ideal for positive impact on situational awareness. Tumer &
Bajwa (1999) conducted a survey of Engine Health
realizing the benefits of LAT owing to its particular
merits during high workload. This is especially true in Monitoring (EI-IM) literature and concluded that
automated EHM is hindered primarily by too much
free flight aviation cockpits, the applied aim of this
uncertain monitoring data and too many false alarms
study. Furthermore, LAT had no effect on decision
that
cause humans' reluctance to rely on the system.
making bias but a significant positive effect on
This study implies that EHM systems could
accuracy during high operator workload. Using the
specifically
benefit from likelihood alarm technology
DM model as an assessment tool, participants
because of the higher decision making accuracy,
acknowledged more true alarms and ignored more
which
translates to more hits and less false alarms,
false alarms when assisted by LAT. According to
displayed by EICAS users in the experiment.
Xiao & Seagull (1999), this is desirable in that high
Additionally,
display monitors interacting with LAT in
rates of false alarm acknowledgments (and low
any similar function would trust alarms more and
PPVs) have been empirically shown to decrease
better resist the cry wolf effect because of the higher
performance of human-machine systems (Sorkin &
PPV. Given high degrees of display integration with
Woods, 1985; Lawless, 1994; Breznitz, 1984;
current
automated systems, LAT's mitigation of outBliss, Gilson, & Deaton, 1995; Bliss, Dunn, &
of-the-loop performance has been demonstrated
Fuller, 1995).
further with this experiment's first stage analysis of
Likelihood alarm technology has workloadDr. Bustamante's a-b SDT decision making model
minimizing and efficiency-maximizing benefits too.
of accuracy and bias. Decision support tools in all
These findings also have more implications for
domains requiring similar human monitoring roles of
minimal attentional costs of LAT compared to BAT,
dynamic fault management would better serve if
because workload and attention are similar
outfitted with LAT. Considering the delicate and
constructs (Kantowitz & Casper, 1988). Consider
crucial delegation of tasks between humans and
that if an alarm inflicts a high enough mental
workload, performance decreases on other parts of automation, discussed in the introduction, it is not a
far leap to acknowledge the positive role that LAT
the human-machine system too (Kantowitz &
may
play in better coalescing human monitors and
Casper). This is where LAT really excels, because it
alarm systems.
provides the monitor with a PPV that permits him/
One potential limitation of this study lies in the
her to prioritize tasks and decide whether to
acknowledge the alarm in an effort to save cognitive low-fidelity flight simulation, which had to be so
because of participant pool limitations. Training
resources, or respond and take possible action.
Using the a-b Signal Detection Theory Model in this student participants to interact with EICAS in a high
fidelity flight simulation is unreasonable because mo
study as a more robust framework than traditional
are unfamiliar with commercial aviation practices.
SDT theory allowed accuracy and response bias to
Additionally, this study only examined the first stage
be analyzed independently in the acknowledgement
of the DM model. Analyzing how humans make
stage. This was advantageous because most alarm
interactions are divided into two stages: recognition/ decisions under the conditions of this experiment is
part of a larger line of research in the University of
acknowledgment and corrective/evasive action.
Idaho's
Cognitive Engineering and Decision Making
More research into the second stage of corrective or
Laboratory, under direction of principle investigator
evasive action (post alarm-acknowledgement) is
Dr.
Ernesto A. Bustamante. One intention along this
forthcoming.
research line is to examine the DM model's second
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stage when gauging performance during an engine
malfunctions-correction task. Another suggestion for
future research is to directly assess the attentional
costs of LAT versus BAT and task-critical
information provisions.
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Table 1
Means and Standard Deviations of Participants ' Alarm Response Accuracy
Alarm System
BAS

LAS

M

SD

M

SD

.10

0.51

0.10

0.77

0.09

.90

0.50

0.00

0.50

0.01

Probability of Engine Malfunctions

Table 2
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Participants' Alarm Response Accuracy
Source

df

SS

MS

F

Partia1112

Probability of Engine Malfunctions (P)

1.00

0.20

0.20

39.63*

.52

Alarm System (AS)

1.00

0.16

0.16

31.90*

.47

P x AS

1.00

0.17

0.17

34.20*

.49

36.00

0.18

0.01

Error
< .01
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Table 3
Means and Standard Deviations o Partici s ants' Alarm Res onse Bias
Alarm System
BAS

LAS
M SD

M

SD

.10

0.41

0.37

0.43

0.12

.90

1.00

0.00

1.00

0.01

Pi1:)LmilLLALEngine Malfunctions

Table 4
Analysis of Variance Source Table for Participants ' Alarm Response Bias
Source
Probability of Engine Malfunctions (P)

df
1.00

SS
3.31

MS
3.31

F
89.13*

Partial 112
.71

Alarm System (AS)

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.03*

.00

P x AS

1.00

0.00

0.00

0.06*

.00

Error
*p<.01

36.00

1.34

0.04
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Figure 1. Multi-attribute task battery.

Figure 2. Simulated EICAS display.

System Status
Frlqine 1

Temp

Engine 2

lenip

Figure 3. System status information.
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Figure 4. Participants' alarm response accuracy as a function of the probability of
engine malfunctions and the type of system.
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0.1
0
13 = .10
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Figure 5. Participants' alarm response bias as a function of the probability of engine
malfunctions.

